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Abstract 
This paper evaluates the prospect of China’s energy supply and its impact on economic 
growth from now to 2050.  After considering China’s domestic potential of coal, oil, and gas 
production, potential of energy imports from the rest of the world, as well as potential 
developments of renewable and nuclear energy, the paper finds that China is likely to face an 
insurmountable energy crisis beyond 2020 and even with optimistic assumptions, drastic declines 
of economic growth rate and the eventual end of economic growth cannot be avoided. 
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According to the World Bank (2008), measured by purchasing power parity, China now 
accounts for 10 percent of world GDP, about half of the current size of the US economy.  Since 
2000, China’s share in world GDP has been growing at about 0.5 percentage point a year while 
the US share has been falling at about 0.3 percentage point a year.  Under these trends, China 
could overtake the US and become the world’s largest economy by around 2020. 
 China’s economic growth has been heavily energy intensive and arguably the single most 
important factor behind the rapid growth of global energy demand and greenhouse gases 
emission in recent years.  China now accounts for 15 percent of the world’s primary energy 
consumption and under the current trend could overtake the US to become the world’s largest 
energy consumer by 2010.  China has already overtaken the US to become the world’s largest 
carbon dioxide emitter and now accounts for one-fifth of the global emissions. 
 Is China’s economic growth sustainable from an energy and environmental perspective?  
If not, how will the energy and environmental constraints shape the future of China and the rest 
of the world?  China’s energy consumption, like that of the rest of the world, depends heavily on 
the nonrenewable fossil fuels.  Now there is a growing body of evidence suggesting that the 
global production of fossil fuels is likely to peak in the not very distant future and this will 
happen even without taking into account the environmental constraints on greenhouse gases 
emissions.  This paper evaluates the prospect of China’s energy supply and its impact on 
economic growth from now to 2050.  After considering China’s domestic potential of coal, oil, 
and gas production, potential of energy imports from the rest of the world, as well as potential 
developments of renewable and nuclear energy, the paper finds that China is likely to face an 
insurmountable energy crisis beyond 2020 and even with optimistic assumptions, drastic declines 
of economic growth rate and the eventual end of economic growth cannot be avoided.  These 
outcomes could have major implications for the political and social development within China 
and in the rest of the world. 
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Peak Energy: World Production of Oil, Natural Gas, and Coal 
 In 1956, M. King Hubbert, an American geologist who worked for the Shell Oil 
Company, predicted that the US oil production would peak around 1970, a prediction that was 
later confirmed by the actual trajectory of the US oil production (see Heinberg 2004: 87-92).  
Since then, many other important oil producers have reached the peak and their production has 
been in decline.  The two most important European producers, Britain and Norway, peaked in 
1999 and 2001 respectively.  Mexico, which was the world’s fifth largest producer, peaked in 
2004.  The current evidence suggests that Russia, the world’s second largest producer, is likely to 
have peaked in 2007. 
 Colin J. Campbell, an Irish petroleum geologist, conducted a detailed study of the world’s 
oil discovery history and pointed out that the world oil discoveries peaked in the 1960s 
(Campbell 2005).  In a recent research report, the German Energy Watch Group argued that the 
world oil production might have peaked in 2006 (Energy Watch Group 2007).  The Association 
for the Study of Peak Oil and Gas Ireland now estimates the world oil production peak to take 
place in 2008 (ASPO 2008). 
Dave Rutledge, chair of the Division of Engineering and Applied Science at California 
Institute of Technology, studied the historical series of world oil and natural gas production and 
concluded that about one-third of the world’s ultimately recoverable resources of oil and gas 
have already been exploited, implying a peak of the world total production of oil and gas around 
2015 (Rutledge 2007a). 
A common technique used in predicting the ultimate recoverable amount of a 
nonrenewable resource is known as “Hubbert Linearization.”  As the production level 
approaches the peak, a linear relationship is likely to be formed between the growth rate of the 
cumulative production of the resource (that is, the ratio of the current annual production over the 
cumulative production from all previous years) and the cumulative production.  The horizontal 
intercept of the linear function would indicate the ultimate recoverable amount and the peak 
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production is likely to take place when about half of the ultimate recoverable amount has been 
depleted (Korpela 2005). 
 Applying Hubbert Linearization to the historical data of world oil and natural gas 
production, the regression results suggest that the world oil production peak is likely to take 
place in 2008 and the world natural gas production peak in 2031.1 
 Since 2000, global coal production has been growing at about 5 percent a year, making a 
larger contribution to the net increase in global energy supply than any other energy resource.  
Since the industrial revolution, the world’s total cumulative production of coal has been about 
300 billion metric tons (Rutledge 2007b).  The world’s official coal reserves now stand at about 
850 billion metric tons (BP 2008), suggesting an ultimate recoverable amount of about 1.2 
trillion metric tons.  The world currently produces nearly 7 billion metric tons of coal a year.  If 
the current growth rate of world coal production is sustained, the world’s cumulative coal 
production would reach 600 billion metric tons by around 2030, suggesting the world production 
peak by that time. 
 However, the German Energy Watch Group (2007b) believes that the remaining 
recoverable coal resource is in fact much less than is suggested by the official reserves and the 
world coal production peak could take place in 2025.  Rutledge (2007a) estimates that the 
 
1 Historical data of world oil and natural gas production are from Rutledge (2007b).  Since 1965, the data are 
available from the BP Statistical Review of World Energy (BP 2008).  A regression of the cumulative production 
growth rate over the world’s cumulative oil production over the period 1983-2007 indicates an remaining 
recoverable resource of 170 billion metric tons (compared with the world’s official reserves of 168.6 billion metric 
tons), regression R-square being 0.955.  A regression of the cumulative production growth rate over the world’s 
cumulative natural gas production over the period 1995-2007 indicates an remaining recoverable resource of 250 
billion metric tons of oil equivalent (compared with the world’s official reserves of 177.4 trillion cubic meters or 
160 billion metric tons of oil equivalent), regression R-square being 0.895.  
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world’s remaining recoverable coal is likely to be 440 billion metric tons, suggesting the peak 
within ten years.  An application of Hubbert Linearization finds that the world (excluding China) 
production of coal could peak by 2018.2 
 
Peak Energy: China’s Production of Coal, Oil, and Natural Gas 
 Domestic coal production accounts for 72.2 percent of China’s primary energy supply.  
Domestic oil, domestic natural gas, hydro, and imports and stock change (mostly oil) account for 
10.4, 3.5, 2.3, and 11.3 percent respectively.  Nuclear energy and non-hydro renewables together 
account for only 0.3 percent.3 
According to China’s Ministry of Land and Natural Resources, China’s remaining 
recoverable coal amounts to 200 billion metric tons (Cui, ed. 2008:33).  China’s cumulative coal 
production has been about 50 billion metric tons.  China’s annual coal production reached 2.5 
billion metric tons by 2007 and has been growing at an annual rate of 10 percent since 2000.  At 
this rate, China’s cumulative coal production would have passed 125 billion metric tons by 
around 2020. 
 
2 Historical data of world coal production are from Rutledge (2007b) and BP (2008).  A regression of the cumulative 
production growth rate over the world’s cumulative coal production (excluding China) over the period 1950-2007 
indicates a remaining recoverable resource of 330 billion metric tons (compared with the world’s official reserves of 
730 billion metric tons and Rutledge’s estimate of 350 billion metric tons), regression R-square being 0.817. 
3 Data for China’s coal, oil, natural gas, nuclear, and hydro production are from BP (2008).  Imports and stock 
change are derived by subtracting the total domestic production of coal, oil, and natural gas from their total 
consumption.  Renewable contribution is estimated by this author.  Hydro, nuclear, and renewable contributions are 
measured by the electrical energy they represent.  Traditional biomass (such as wood burning in the rural areas) is 
excluded from the total primary energy supply. 
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The BP Statistical Review of World Energy reports China’s coal reserve to be only 114.5 
billion metric tons, about half of the Chinese official estimate (BP 2008).  The German Energy 
Watch Group (2007b) argues that China’s coal production could peak as early as 2015.  An 
exercise of Hubbert Linearization over the period 1970-2007 suggests China’s remaining 
recoverable coal to be 110 billion metric tons (with annual production peaking in 2021).  
By comparison, there is a consensus regarding China’s oil production potential.  The 
consensus among the Chinese researchers is that the domestic oil production is likely to peak 
around 2015, with the peak production level unlikely to be above 200 million metric tons (the 
current annual production is about 190 million metric tons) (Cui, ed. 2008:33). 
China’s natural gas production now makes a small contribution to China’s energy supply, 
but has been growing at 14 percent a year since 2007.  The current annual production is about 70 
billion cubic meters.  The Chinese researchers estimate China’s ultimate recoverable natural gas 
to be 10-13 trillion cubic meters (Cui, ed. 2008:33).  With a 10 percent growth rate of annual 
production, China’s natural gas production could peak by 2030. 
 
China’s Nuclear and Renewable Energy Potential 
 China currently has a nuclear electricity generating capacity of 7 giga-watts.  The 
Chinese government plans to expand the nuclear electricity capacity to 40 giga-watts by 2020 
(Cui, ed. 2008:309). 
 Nuclear electricity generation uses uranium, which is a nonrenewable resource.  The 
German Energy Watch Group (2006) points out that the world’s proved and possible uranium 
resources could last only 30-70 years at the current rate of consumption.  China’s economically 
recoverable uranium is estimated to be 650,000 metric tons (Cui, ed. 2008:34).  If China’s 
nuclear electricity capacity is expanded to 40 giga-watts, China’s annual consumption of 
uranium will need to rise to about 9,000 metric tons.  At this rate, China’s domestic uranium 
resource will be exhausted in about 70 years. 
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 Hydro electricity now accounts for about 15 percent of China’s total electricity 
generation.  The Chinese government plans to expand the hydro electricity generating capacity 
from the current 100 giga-watts to more than 200 giga-watts by 2020.  China’s long-term 
technical potential of hydro electricity is estimated to be 500 giga-watts (Cui, ed. 2008:34). 
 By 2020, the Chinese government plans to expand China’s wind electricity generating 
capacity to 100 giga-watts and biomass electricity generating capacity to 30 giga-watts.  By 2030, 
China’s solar photovoltaic electricity generating capacity is projected to increase to 100 giga-
watts (Cui, ed. 2008:308-309). 
 China’s long-term onshore and offshore wind electricity potential is estimated to be 1,000 
giga-watts (Cui, ed. 2008:273).  By comparison, China’s solar electricity potential is likely to be 
limited.  Solar photovoltaic electricity is much more expensive than wind electricity, is limited to 
daytime generation, and suffers from substantial seasonal variations.  The more promising solar 
electricity technology is known as the solar thermal technology or concentrated solar power.  
With the solar thermal technology, it is possible to store solar energy as heat and thus has less of 
a problem of intermittency.  However, the solar thermal technology works best in tropical or 
subtropical deserts.  China does not have access to comparable geographical areas. 
 In recent years, China’s ecological footprint has been growing rapidly.  According to the 
Living Planet Report (WWF et al. 2006), China’s ecological footprint now doubles China’s own 
biological capacity.  In fact, China’s ecological footprint would be greater than its biological 
capacity even if the effects of energy consumption were excluded.  That is, China’s biological 
capacity has already been stressed to the limit just to provide food for the population.  China is 
also confronted with a potentially devastating water crisis.  Given the severe constraints imposed 
by China’s limited biological capacity and water shortage, biomass is unlikely to make a major 
contribution to China’s future energy supply. 
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The Limits to Growth: Prospect for China’s Energy Supply and Economic Growth from 
Now to 2050 
 Figure 1 presents China’s historical and projected primary energy supply from 1950 to 
2050.  China’s remaining recoverable coal is assumed to be 200 billion tons (the same as China’s 
official estimate) and China’s coal production is projected to peak in 2030.  The oil production is 
projected to peak in 2015 and the natural gas production is assumed to peak in 2047. 
 By 2050, China’s hydro electricity technical potential is assumed to be fully exploited.  
China’s long-term potential of nuclear electricity generating capacity is assumed to be 100 giga-
watts, comparable to the present US nuclear generating capacity. 
 China’s long-term potential of non-hydro renewable electricity generating capacity is 
assumed to be 2,000 giga-watts (including 1,000 giga-watts of wind electricity and 1,000 giga-
watts of solar and other renewable electricity).  Half of this potential is projected to have been 
exploited by 2050.  By comparison, China’s current total electricity generating capacity from all 
sources amounts to about 700 giga-watts. 
 Despite these optimistic assumptions, between now and 2020, China will have to rely 
upon rapid increase in energy imports to sustain rapid economic growth.  From now to 2020, it is 
assumed that China’s energy imports will grow sufficiently rapidly so that China could maintain 
an annual economic growth rate of 8.5 percent. 
 Between 2000 and 2007, China’s energy consumption grew at an average annual rate of 
10 percent.  Between 2007 and 2020, it is assumed that rapid improvements in energy efficiency 
allow China’s energy consumption growth to slow down to 3.9 percent a year.  Nevertheless, 
China’s energy imports will have to grow from 200 million metric tons of oil equivalent to 
nearly 600 million metric tons (and will keep growing if rapid economic growth continues).  
China’s energy imports as a share of the rest of the world’s total production of fossil fuels would 
9 
 
                                                
have to increase from 2.5 percent to 7 percent.4  By comparison, the US energy imports in 2007 
were about 700 million metric tons of oil equivalent.  Beyond 2020, it is assumed that China’s 
energy imports will account for 7.5 percent of the rest of the world’s fossil fuels production. 
 According to the World Bank (2008) measure of GDP and BP Statistical Review of 
World Energy, China’s current level of energy efficiency (measured by purchasing power parity 
of GDP per unit of primary energy consumption) is about $3.7 per kilogram of oil equivalent.  
By comparison, the US energy efficiency is $5.9 per kilogram, Japan’s energy efficiency is $8.6 
per kilogram, the German energy efficiency is $9.0 per kilogram, and the world average is $6.0 
per kilogram.  In the current projection, it is assumed that China’s energy efficiency would more 
than triple and reach $13 per kilogram of oil equivalent by 2050. 
 According to the Annual Report of China’s Energy Development, the average physical 
efficiency of China’s energy system is about 36 percent (Cui, ed. 2008:332).  This result, if 
reliable, would suggest that China’s long-term energy efficiency potential at most would be 
about three times of the present level.  The above projection assumes that this potential would be 
more than fully exploited by 2050.  Figure 2 compares China’s projected energy efficiency with 
the historical energy efficiency performance of the world average as well as the world’s largest 
economies.  
 With energy supply and energy efficiency projected, one can then proceed to project 
economic growth, as GDP is simply the product of primary energy supply and energy efficiency.  
Figure 2 presents China’s historical and projected economic growth rates from 1980 to 2050. 
 It is assumed that the Chinese economy will continue to grow at 8.5 percent a year until 
2020.  After 2020, however, it is extremely unlikely that China’s energy imports from the rest of 
 
4 The world (excluding China) production of coal is projected to peak in 2018.  The rest of the world’s oil and gas 
production is derived by subtracting the projected China’s production from the projected total world production. 
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the world could grow any further.  As energy imports start to decline, economic growth rate 
plunges below 6 percent.  
 It turns out that the rapid growth of renewable energy and energy efficiency will fall far 
short of what is necessary to compensate the decline of fossil fuels.  Figure 1 shows that China’s 
total energy supply peaks around 2030 and declines at an accelerating pace from 2030 to 2050.  
By 2050, the Chinese economy sinks into negative growth and permanent decline. 
 Could there be anything wrong with these projections?  The above assumptions are 
between optimistic and wildly optimistic.  The coal projection is based on the highest estimate of 
China’s remaining recoverable coal.  The oil and natural gas projections are fairly 
uncontroversial.  The hydro electricity is expanded to the limit.  Barring unexpected 
technological miracles, there is little scope for further expansion of nuclear electricity.  Both the 
renewable and energy efficiency projections are on the optimistic side.  Energy imports are 
allowed to grow to the point beyond which the rest of the world would be forced into energy 
starvation.  What else could one do to save China’s economic growth? 
 Therefore, it seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that the availability of energy 
resources is likely to impose an insurmountable limit to China’s future economic growth.  It is 
obvious that such a finding, if confirmed by the actual development of future events, will be of 
enormous significance for the global political and social development. 
 First of all, as the US imperialism has been in secular decline, many have expected or 
hoped that China would replace the US to become the next leader of the capitalist world system, 
leading a successful systemic reconstruction.  However, given the findings of this paper, by the 
mid-21st century, the Chinese economy will probably find itself in permanent decline (if not 
complete disintegration) and China will be in no position to lead the restructuring of the existing 
world system. 
 Within China, until now, the Chinese ruling elites have relied upon rapid economic 
growth to alleviate or divert various social conflicts and tensions.  However, beyond 2020, as the 
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Chinese economy falls into increasingly deeper economic crisis, it will become impossible for 
the ruling elites to contain the unfulfilled economic, social and political aspirations from the 
broad masses of the population.  Thus, in all likelihood, economic crisis will be followed by 
political and social explosions.  
 Finally, the limits to China’s economic growth could turn out to coincide with the limits 
to global economic growth.  The capitalist world system is one based on endless drive for profit 
and capital accumulation.  After centuries of ruthless accumulation, we have by now reached the 
point where the global ecological system is on the verge of total collapse.  The global energy 
crisis and other aspects of the global environmental crisis represent the strong signals that the 
nature sends to the humanity: the existing social system has reached its historical limit and the 
future survival of the humanity and the civilization depends on the building of a new, equitable, 
and sustainable society as soon as possible. 
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